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CHALLENGES TO ARBITRATION UNDER

ILLINOIS PUBLIC SECTOR LABOR
RELATIONS STATUTES
Robert Perkovich*
and Mark H. Stein**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Today, collective bargaining and labor arbitration are firmly
embedded in employment relations; however, that was not always the
case. In fact, early common law decisions used what now appears to
be unusual and archaic doctrines in order to legitimize collective
bargaining agreements even in the private sector.' For example,
some courts regarded the labor agreement as a codification of local
customs or usages incorporated into an individual employee's hiring
contract.' Under this codification theory, the labor agreement itself
was not regarded as a contract but had legal effect only as its terms
were absorbed into the individual contract. 3 Another theory used
*
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I. H. EDWARDS, T. CLARK & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 693-95 (3d ed. 1985) [hereinafter LABOR RELATIONS LAW] (citing R. SMITH, L. MERRIFIELD, T. ST. ANTOINE & C. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (7th
ed. 1984)).
2. See Rice, Collective Labor Agreements in American Law, 44 HARV. L. REV. 572, 582
(1931).
3. See Cross Mountain Coal Co. v. Ault, 157 Tenn. 461, 9 S.W.2d 692 (1928). A discharged employee and officer of a local branch of the United Mine Workers Union filed suit
against the owner and operator of a coal mining concern for damages resulting from breach of
contract. See id. The employee complained that the owner wrongly discharged him during a
lockout in the middle of a two year contract with the union. Id. The employee won reinstatement in arbitration after airing his grievance over the discharge as required pursuant to the
employer/union contract. See id. at 464, 9 S.W.2d at 695. When the mine was reopened the
employee was denied reinstatement for the same reasons asserted by the employer in the previous arbitration. Id. The court held that the employer discriminated against the employee due
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early in the history of collective bargaining was that the contract
was negotiated by the union as the agent for the employees who were
the actual principals to the agreement. 4 A third theory used to legitimize collective bargaining agreements was to regard the agreement
as a third party beneficiary contract with the employer and the union
as the mutual promisor and promisee, and the employees as the
beneficiaries. 5
This Article will begin by tracing the historical origins of labor
arbitration, distinguishing between the evolution of that process in
the private and public sector.' The Article will then focus particularly on issues relevant to challenges of arbitrability in the public
sector.7 The Article will conclude with the Illinois experience as one
to union membership and therefore breached the contract prohibiting discrimination on account of union membership. Id. at 465, 9 S.W.2d at 696; see also Hudson v. Cincinnati, N.O.
& Texas Pac. Ry., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47 (1913). A union member who was discharged
brought suit against his employer for prospective wages for the time period between employee's date of discharge and the end date of the union contract with the employer. Id. The
court held that the union had not made an employment agreement for the employee and that
the employee must make an employment agreement for himself. Id. at 712, 154 S.W. at 48.
4. See, e.g., Maisel v. Sigman, 123 Misc. 714, 205 N.Y.S. 807 (Sup. Ct. 1924). The
plaintiff, a manufacturing jobber of ladies coats, sued the defendant. who was the president of
the union, in order to set aside a labor contract, made by the parties, contending that the
agreement was void for lack of mutuality because the contract was not made by union members directly. Id. The court held that the union acted as an agent for the employees in negotiating the contract; therefore, the agreement was valid as a mutual agreement of employment.
Id. at 730, 205 N.Y.S. at 820.
5. See, e.g., Marranzano v. Riggs Nat'l Bank of Wash., 184 F.2d 349 (D.C. Cir.
1950). A union member and former employee of the defendant sued defendant's executors for
wrongful discharge in violation of the collective bargaining agreement that restricted discharges for anything other than a "good and sufficient cause." Id. at 350. The union lost for
failing to allege facts that would have established that the discharge had not been for "good
and sufficient cause." Id. at 351. Additionally, the court held that an individual employee
covered by a collective bargaining agreement may sue for damages suffered because of the
employer's violation of the agreement when the contract's object was to define and protect the
employee's right to job security, salary and working conditions. Id. at 350-51; see also Yazoo
& Mississippi Valley R.R. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So. 669 (1931). The plaintiff, a
nonunionized porter and brakeman on defendant's trains, sued defendant-employer in contract
as a party not in privity to the contract seeking backpay. Id. The plaintiff claimed that his
salary was lowered after the defendant realized that he was not covered by the collective bargaining agreement. Id. The court held that a third party may recover directly on a contract to
which he is not a third party when three conditions are met:
(1) [w]hen the terms of the contract are expressly broad enough to include the
third party either by name as one of a specified class, and (2) the said third party
was evidently within the intent of the terms so used, . . . if (3) the promisee had, in
fact, a substantial and articulate interest in the welfare of the said third party in
respect to the subject of the contract.
Id., at 6, 133 So. at 671; see also LABOR RELATIONS LAW, supra note 1, at 694.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 10-39.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 40-53.
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of the newest public sector jurisdictions to join those states with labor regulatory statutes in the public sector.8 This Article will also
consider whether the unique Illinois experience may represent an improvement in this area of the law.9
II.

HISTORIC ORIGINS OF LABOR ARBITRATION

In the private sector, the Wagner Act of 193510 represented the

first serious effort by government to regulate the employment relationship as it related to labor relations." Specifically, the Act's
thrust was to protect the rights of employees to organize into unions
and to prohibit employer practices that infringed on that process. 2
Significantly, the Wagner Act did not attempt to regulate union
practices.' 3 In fact, unions were not regarded in most jurisdictions as
legal entities; therefore, they could not be sued directly for their failure to honor whatever obligations they might had. 4
By the mid-1940's, following the massive and successful organizational drives of organized labor under the Wagner Act, the political climate had changed. As a result, Congress passed the TaftHartley Act of 194715 which, among other things, imposed restrictions on union practices.' 6 Taft-Hartley also amended the National
Labor Relations Act to include section 301, which regulated suits by
and against labor organizations through jurisdiction conferred upon
federal courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements.' In so
doing, Congress attempted to maintain some degree of stability in
labor relations by regulating the collective bargaining agreements
between employers and unions. 8
One of the primary ways in which this regulation took place was
through the role played by the federal courts under section 301 in
8. See infra text accompanying notes 54-209.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 54-209.
10. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act §§ 1-3, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982).
11. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 30-34 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing in detail the Wagner

Act and criticizing the Act as "one-sided legislation").
12. See id.
13. See id. at 32-35 (noting the irresponsible practices by unions and discussing how
these problems eventually resulted in the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947).
14. Id. at 35-42.
15. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act §§ 1-17, 201-407, 29 U.S.C. §§
141-167, 171-197 (1982).
16. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 11, at 35-42 (discussing in detail the
Taft-Hartley changes).
17. Taft-Hartley Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982) (stating that "[s]uits for
violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization . . . may be brought in
any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties.").
18. THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 11, at 877 (explaining this area).
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labor arbitration. Section 301 placed the authority to enforce labor
agreements in the federal courts in order to achieve the federal policy of stability in labor relations between employers and employees
as represented by labor organizations.19 In Textile Workers Union of
America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, the Supreme Court considered an action brought under section 301 for specific enforcement of
an agreement to arbitrate.2 0 The Supreme Court, in reviewing this
matter, declared that the employer's agreement, to arbitrate was a
"quid pro quo" for the union's no-strike agreement and that industrial peace could best be obtained only through arbitration."
In 1960, the Supreme Court elaborated upon the "quid pro
quo" doctrine in a series of three cases known as the Steelworkers
Trilogy.22 In American Manufacturing Co.,23 the Supreme Court
addressed the point at which judicial intervention was appropriate.24
The Court held that it was not the function of the courts to construe
a collective bargaining agreement that was subject to arbitration because, in agreeing to arbitrate, the parties bargained for determination by an arbitrator, not by the courts.25 The Court further opined
that the processing of even frivolous claims may have a therapeutic
effect. In Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,26 the Court was faced
with a question of substantive arbitrability and ruled that although
substantive arbitrability was an issue to be determined by the Court,
arbitrability was to be determined with deference to the central role
of arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement. 2 7 Because
of a public policy favoring arbitration, the Court also announced a
presumption of arbitrability stating "[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute; [d]oubt should be re19. Id.
20. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
21.

Id. at 455.

22. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) [hereinafter
Steelworkers Trilogy].
23. 363 U.S. at 568 (stating that because the parties had agreed to an arbitrator's deter-

mination, "[t]he courts
24.

. . .

have no business weighing the merits of the grievance.").

Id. at 567.

25. Id. at 567-68.
26. 363 U.S. at 582 (noting that Congressional policy in favor of the resolution of disputes through arbitration requires that judicial inquiry be limited to whether the parties
agreed to arbitrate).
27. Id. at 582-83.
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solved in favor of coverage.""
In the third trilogy case, Enterprise Wheel,29 the Court addressed the issue of judicial review of an arbitration award, expressing the view that, because the parties had contracted for the arbitrator's judgment, the court would not reject that judgment merely
because it might have a different view of the issue.30 Moreover, the
Court held that the "industrial common law-the practice of the industry and the shop-" was part of the collective bargaining agreement, and that the courts were not situated to determine and interpret those matters.3 1 Accordingly, the Court generally defines the
limits of judicial review of an arbitrator's interpretation so that the
arbitrator's award is deemed legitimate as long as the arbitrator's
decision is based on the contractual agreement.32 Only when the arbitrator's words "manifest an infidelity to this obligation" are the
courts to refuse enforcement of the award. 3
As a result of judicial recognition of labor arbitration in labor
relations, and the deference accorded to the process, employers and
unions have used and continue to use labor arbitration as an effective
means of resolving employment disputes. 4 The benefits of the arbitration process are now generally accepted.3 5 First, arbitration provides a relatively speedy and inexpensive means of settling disputes.36
Secondly, arbitration gives the employee the security of knowing
that the ultimate recourse for the resolution of any grievance he or
she may have lies with a neutral party, the arbitrator, and not with
the employer.37 Thirdly, arbitration helps conserve judicial resources
by providing a means to settle most disputes without court action.38
Fourth, and most importantly, arbitration serves the national labor
policy as a mechanism for the maintenance of industrial peace pro28. Id.
29. 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
30. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 598; accord Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 53 (1974) (holding that the arbitrator is the "proctor of the [parties'] bargain.").
31. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581-82.
32. Id.
33. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at 597.
34. See LABOR RELATIONS LAW, supra note 1,at 710-11; see also Remarks of Edward
B. Miller on 'The NLRB-Relevant to the Future', Daily Labor Reports (BNA) No. 188, at DI (Sept. 29, 1989).
35. See LABOR RELATIONS LAW, supra note I, at 710-11 (discussing certain aspects of
arbitration in detail).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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viding an alternative to the strike in the resolution of day to day
disputes. 9 In fact, labor arbitration has been regarded as a substitute for industrial strength; the collective bargaining agreement has
been regarded as a generalized code to govern conduct setting forth
a system of industrial self-government. Therefore, the question is
whether the arbitration process, readily embraced and used with dramatic success in the private sector, can and should be regarded as
the same in the public sector.
III.

ARBITRATION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

At first, one might readily conclude that there should be few
reasons, if any, to restrict or prohibit the use of labor arbitration in
the public sector. Arbitration in the public sector would be, in contrast to the private sector, less expensive, less time consuming, and
an important method of resolving disputes. 40 In fact, some have argued persuasively that many of the same factors motivating the use
of arbitration in the private sector are equally true in the public
sector.41
However, there are circumstances present in the public sector
that are not present in the private sector, or present in the private
sector but to a lesser degree than in the public sector. 2 For example,
although private sector employment is obviously regulated by various
statutes and ordinances at the local, state, and federal level, the regulation of public sector employment is more diverse. Diversity is
demonstrated by the fact that public bodies and public employees as
the agents of those bodies are governed not only with respect to their
employment, but also with respect to the purpose for which their
jobs exist through a myriad of laws and doctrines.44 For example,
did a state legislature or a city council intend, by enacting a public
employee bargaining law, that certain issues be subject to a grievance procedure, or should those issues be left to the unbridled discretion of the public employer? 45 To answer the above question, the
39. Id.
40.

Id.

41.

See e.g., id. at 705-06 (quoting REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 20TH CEN-

TURY TASK FORCE ON LABOR DISPUTES IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT PICKETS AT CITY HALL; 17-

18 (1970)). The Task Force noted the impartiality of third party arbitrators, the wide scope of
contractual grievance arbitration procedures as opposed to civil service laws, and the increasing use of arbitration in the public sector. See id.
42. See J. Grodin & J. Najita, Judicial Response to Public-SectorArbitration, in PUBLIC-SECTOR BARGAINING 229-65 (2d ed. 1988) (providing an in-depth discussion of this area).

43. See id. at 229-30.
44.

Id. at 232-38.

45. Id. at 229-65.
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effect and potential entanglement of long existing civil service laws
must also be considered.46
The remainder of this Article will identify some of the considerations that affect the applicability of labor arbitration in the public
sector and which have been used as challenges to arbitrability in the
public sector.47 After identifying those areas, this Article will describe how Illinois, one of the newest jurisdictions with a public employee bargaining statute, has dealt with these challenges.48
A.

Origins Of Challenges To Public Sector Arbitration

The two most basic challenges to arbitration in the public sector
arise out of common law doctrines with origins that predate public
and private sector collective bargaining by hundreds of years.
The first, referred to as the sovereignty doctrine, provides that,
as government, the public employer is the equivalent of the sovereign, and that no private organization (such as a labor union) or
individual (the arbitrator) can tell the sovereign what it can or cannot do. 49 The sovereignty doctrine, in this context, may be said to
stem from the ancient notion that "the king can do no wrong."
The second basic common law doctrine bearing on this issue is
the nondelegability doctrine. 50 This doctrine provides that only government can implement the public trust because government,
through elected officials, is accountable to the people via the ballot
box. 51 Accordingly, to permit a private organization or individual,
such as a labor union or arbitrator, to exercise governmental power
is inappropriate because those organizations or individuals are not
similarly accountable to the public trust. 52
Finally, the arbitration process, both in terms of the ultimate
resolution and the procedure used, must be viewed in light of potential conflicts with other state laws because all authority for the conduct of public bodies derives from those laws. 53
46.

Id. at 230.

47. See infra text accompanying notes 49-53.
48.

See infra text accompanying notes 54-209.

49. See, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'r, Local Union No. 321 v. Water
Works Bd., 276 Ala. 462, 163 So. 2d 619 (1964).

50. See J. Grodin & J. Najita, supra note 42, at 232-38 (noting that "[c]ourts at common law disapproved the arbitration of public-sector labor grievances as an unlawful delega-

tion of governmental power.").
51. See id.; see also Note, Legality and Propriety of Agreements, to Arbitrate Major
and Minor Disputes in Public Employment, )4 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 129-35 (1968) (authored by James M. Ringer).
52. See J. Qrodin & J. Najita, supra note 42, at 232-38.
53. Id. at 234-38 (noting that a number of courts "refused to enforce arbitration agree-
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B.

Challenges to Public Sector Arbitration in Illinois
Before 198454

In 1906, the Illinois Supreme Court held that school boards had
been granted discretionary power to "conduct and manage common
schools" and that such power could not be delegated to another authority. 5 The principles underlying the 1906 nondelegability doctrine concern the fundamental question of how local government derives and exercises lawful power in Illinois society.
Nondelegability issues arise in two factual situations.5 6 The first
raises the issue of whether a public body may delegate its own discretionary decision-making authority to an arbitrator.57 In the second, the validity of the terms of an agreement is questioned on the
grounds that the local government could not legally limit by contract
its own nondelegable discretionary authority.5 8 In Lindblad, the Illinois Supreme Court noted that the school board in question had the
discretionary power vested by statute to employ teachers; the court
stated that "such discretionary powers may not [be delegated by the
municipality] to another." 59
By the 1970's, school boards could enter into valid and binding
collective bargaining agreements with public employee unions as an
exercise of the power to engage in activity necessary and proper for
ments [because] some law . . . external to the agreement preclude[d] the public agency from
'bargaining away' or 'delegating' its authority or discretion with respect to the particular issue
in dispute.").
54. In 1984, Illinois passed the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act (ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 48, para. 1701-1721 (1986)) and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, para. 1601-1627 (1986)) creating a comprehensive regulatory scheme over public sector labor relations including the use of labor arbitration. These Acts are described below
in greater detail. See infra text and accompanying notes 75-139 (discussing IELRA); see also
infra text and accompanying notes 139-209 (discussing IPLRA). Before discussing the impact
of those statutes, the prevailing state of the law regarding challenges to public sector arbitration before their passage must be considered. This section is devoted to that subject.
55. Lindblad v. Board of Educ., 221 Ill. 261, 271, 77 N.E. 450, 453 (1906).
56. See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482
(1951).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59.

Lindblad, 221 Ill. at 271, 77 N.E. at 453 (citing J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE

154 (4th ed. 1890); City of Chicago v. Trotter, 136 II1.
430, 26 N.E. 359 (1891)). The court's concern in these cases is that public decision-making
will be privatized. See Lindblad, 221 Ill. at 271, 77 N.E. at 453; Trotter, 136 I11.at 430, 26
N.E. at 359; see also J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
(5th ed. 1911). A municipal corporation possesses certain powers. Id. at 154. The limitations
on delegation of power to a third party stem from the notion that governmental power at the
local level is derived from narrow municipal corporate power and, once conferred on a specific
unit of government, that entity has no right to confer its authority on another. Id.
LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
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the operation of schools.6 0 In Classroom Teachers Association, the
court stated that such an agreement was a proper function of the
school board so long as it does not involve a surrender of the school
board's legal discretion. 61 In reviewing provisions of a collective bargaining agreement providing for procedures to be followed in cases
of involuntary transfers against the standard, the court stated:
The procedures in the agreement only serve to maintain a high
standard of efficiency and professionalism in the school system.
They do not inhibit the discretionary powers of the board and are
entirely consistent with the modern concept of due process, and in
fact when applied . . . are simply rules to supplement that statutory scheme of fair play.62
However, when in a later case a union relied on Classroom Teachers
Association, the court drew a distinction between the rights of nontenured teachers and the rights afforded by statute to those teachers
with tenure.6 3 The court stated that because the school code established and maintained numerous distinctions between tenured and
non-tenured teachers, the collective bargaining agreement in that
case imposed conditions at variance with state law.64 Accordingly, an
agreement that was at variance with the rights afforded in the
School Code involved an illegal surrender of the statutory duty of
65
the school board.
Later, the Illinois Supreme Court held that where a school
board complied with the School Code, but not with the agreement,
its discharge of a probationary teacher was valid. 66 The court, citing
Lindblad, stated that the school board's discretionary power conferred by the School Code was nondelegable and saw no need to
explicate the matter further.6 7
Essentially the same reasoning was utilized when a court held
that a community college board could not delegate or dilute its statutory power concerning non-tenured teachers. 8 The court stated
that as long as evaluations had been conducted and the result of the
60.

Classroom Teachers Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 15 Ill. App. 3d 224, 304 N.E.2d 516

(App. Ct. 1973).
61. Id. at 227, 304 N.E.2d at 519.
62. Id.
63. Wesclin Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 30 Ill. App. 3d 67, 74, 331 N.E.2d 335, 342
(App. Ct. 1975).
64. Id.
65. See Wesclin Educ. Ass'n, 30 I11.App. 3d 67, 331 N.E.2d 335.
66. See Illinois Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 62 Ill. 2d 127, 340 N.E.2d 7 (1975).
67. Id. at 129, 340 N.E.2d at 9.
68. Board of Trustees v. Krizek, 113 Ill. App. 3d 222, 446 N.E.2d 941 (App. Ct. 1983).
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evaluations were available to the board, the statute had been complied with and any decision to discharge was "statutorily sound. 69
Caselaw discussing those matters that are inarbitrable because
they can not be delegated and the cases discussing the validity of
arbitrators' awards are based on the same principles. 70 For example,
an arbitrator could not award sabbatical leave, despite a contractual
guarantee of a minimum number of leaves, where a statute vested
discretion on leaves in the school board. 71 The subject matter of the
contract was deemed illegal and unenforceable. 72
However, the courts have stated that a unit of government can
incorporate into an agreement a salary schedule set after bargaining.7 3 If an arbitrator interprets the salary schedule terms within the
contract in the grievance procedure, he or she will then only be enforcing the school board's decision. 4
C. Challenges to Arbitration After 1984
1. Challenges Under the Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Act.-The passage of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act
(hereinafter "IELRA") 75 in 1984 ultimately cast another light on
these issues. Accordingly, the Illinois Educational Labor Relations
Board and the courts of Illinois were called upon to decide cases
involving the nondelegability doctrine and arbitration since the enactment of the IELRA.
On July 1, 1984, the Illinois General Assembly passed the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act, a comprehensive labor regulatory statute providing that employees have the right to organize into
unions, to engage in union activity, to engage in collective bargaining
through representatives of their own choosing, and to refuse to engage in any of these acts free from any interference by employers or
unions.76 The IELRA set forth certain prohibited conduct on the
part of unions and employers, including the prohibition of bargaining
in bad faith.77 The act also required compliance with arbitration
69. Id. at 225, 446 N.E.2d at 944.
App. 3d 981, 372 N.E.2d 899 (App, Ct. 1978).
70. Board of Educ. v. Murphy, 56 I11.
71. Id. at 982, 372 N.E.2d at 900.
72. Id.
App. 3d 290,
73. County of Will v. Local 1028 Will County Employees Union, 79 I11.
398 N.E.2d 139 (App. Ct. 1980).
74. Id. at 294, 398 N.E.2d at 144.
75. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1701-1721 (1986).
76. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1703 (1986)(setting forth the rights of employees).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1714(a)(5), 1714(b)(3) (designating unfair labor practices to include violations of good faith collective bargaining).
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awards by employers and unions.78
The statute establishes a duty to bargain in good faith on the
part of both employers and unions.79 Moreover, the IELRA places a
prohibition on any agreements by the parties that conflict with other
Illinois statutes.8 0 The parties to the collective bargaining agreement
may supplement any terms dealing with employee rights and wages,
hours, and terms and conditions of employment in order to comply
with statutes passed by the General Assembly of Illinois."' Finally,
the Act provided that all labor agreements shall have a no-strike and
no-lockout clause, and all collective bargaining agreements shall
have a grievance and arbitration procedure culminating in final and
binding arbitration. 2
Therefore, it appeared clear that labor arbitration and collective
bargaining in public education in Illinois was firmly ensconced.
However, challenges to arbitration both to prevent arbitration of a
claim and to gain review of a claim that had been arbitrated continue, often raising the same issues and common law defenses relied
on by employers prior to passage of the Act. 83 Because of the unfair
labor practice provisions, making it an unfair labor practice to bargain in bad faith and to fail to comply with a binding arbitration
award, many of these issues were reviewed by the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board (hereinafter "IELRB"). 84
In River Grove School District No. 85 ,8" the Board was faced
with the question of whether the failure to arbitrate was an unfair
labor practice under the Act. Relying on the statutory language
mandating grievance and arbitration clauses in collective bargaining
agreements that end in final and binding arbitration, the Board held
that the failure to arbitrate could be an unfair labor practice within
the meaning of section 14(a)(5), which prohibits bargaining in bad
faith.8 6 The Board went on to rule, however, that such conduct was a
violation of section 14(a)(5) only when the employer had contractually agreed to arbitrate the claim and where the arbitration award
78.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para 1714(a)(8), 1714 (b)(6)(designating failure to comply

with binding arbitration awards to be an unfair labor practice).
79.

See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1710.
REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1710(b).

80. ILL.
81.

Id.

82. Id. at 1710(c).
83. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Rockford Educ. Ass'n, 150 Il1. App. 3d 198, 501 N.E.2d
338 (App. Ct. 1986), rev'd, 123 Ill. 2d 216, 526 N.E.2d 149 (1988).
84. See, e.g., Chicago Board of Educ. v. Chicago Teacher's Union, 142 II1. App. 3d 527,
491 N.E.2d 1259 (App. Ct. 1986).
85. 3 P.E.R.I. (LRP) 1 1019 (1987).
86. Id. at VII-56, 57.
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does not conflict with other laws as prohibited in section 10(b) of the
Act.8 7 In that case, the subject of the grievance clearly fell within
the grievance procedure and definition of grievances contained in the
collective bargaining agreement.8 8 However, the employer argued
that in the event the arbitrator ordered a remedy providing for the
reinstatement of an employee, such a remedy would contravene the
school code and common law powers of the employer, which provided that the power to employ individuals resided solely in a school
board.8 9 The IELRB decided, however, that this argument as to
remedy was premature because the Board had no idea whether the
arbitrator would sustain the grievance and if so what remedy would
be ordered. 90
On appeal the Fourth District Appellate Court adopted the doctrine that the failure to arbitrate violated the Act.9 1 However, the
court found that the violation is not one of bargaining in bad faith,
but rather is a violation of section 14(a)(1) which prohibits employees from interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the
exercise of their rights as guaranteed by the Act.9 2
As noted above, challenges to arbitrability in Illinois have also
been raised, notwithstanding the provisions of the statute once the
arbitration has been held and the award has been tendered.9 3 Again
the challenge has often been that the award conflicts with statutory
powers residing in the employer.
In Board of Education v. IELRB 9 4 the IELRB was faced for
the first time with the argument that an employer's failure to comply
with an arbitration award was excused because the award was unenforceable.9 5 The IELRB found that the award was enforceable. 9
More importantly, however, an employer, in Chicago Board of
Education v. Chicago Teachers Union, argued that this role of reviewing the award for enforceability resides solely in the circuit
courts under the Uniform Arbitration Act. 7 The circuit court stayed
87.

Id. at VII-58.

88. Id.
89.

Id.

90. See id.
91.

See Prairie State College v. IELRB, 173 I11.App. 3d 395, 527 N.E.2d 538 (App. Ct.

1988).
92. See id.
93.
94.

See, e.g., id.
170 111.App. 3d 490, 524 N.E.2d 711 (App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1988).

95. See id.
96.
97.

Id. at 492, 524 N.E.2d at 713.
142 111.App. 3d 527, 491 N.E.2d 1259 (App. Ct. 1st Dist. 1986) (referring to ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 10, para. 101-123 (1975)).
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the proceedings, and the First District Appellate Court rejected the
employer's argument and reversed the decision.9" The First District
found that, because the sister statute of the IELRA, 99 the Illinois
Public Employees Labor Relations Act (hereinafter "IPLRA"), °°
contains no provisions prohibiting the failure to comply with an arbitration award, and because the IELRA expressly recognizes the difference in educational employment, the Board's assertion of jurisdiction in this matter essentially divests the circuit court's jurisdiction
of labor arbitration awards in public educational employment.' 0 '
The court also relied upon the fact that the IELRA, unlike the
IPLRA, does not refer to the continuing jurisdiction of the Uniform
Arbitration Act, and that the judicial review of IELRB cases was
placed in any judicial district in which the Board maintains an office.10 2 In the court's view, this manifested an intent on the part of
the legislature that there be uniformity in this area which can be
obtained only by centering jurisdiction in the IELRB as reviewed by
the Fourth District Appellate Court. 03
The Fourth District Appellate Court was faced with the same
question in Board of Education v. Compton,104 and the Fourth District came to the same conclusion as the First District, relying essentially on the very same rationale. However, because the Second District Appellate Court' 05 and another panel of the First District
Appellate Court' 06 found that jurisdiction would still lie in the circuit courts notwithstanding the passage of the IELRA, the Illinois
Supreme Court accepted an appeal in Compton.'0 '
In Compton an employee was employed by the school district as
a non-tenured teacher and represented by a labor organization. 0 8 At
the conclusion of the school year the District terminated the employee's employment, and the labor organization subsequently filed a
98. Id.
99. Id. (referring to ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1601-1627 (1985)).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 529, 491 N.E.2d at 1261-62.
102. Id. This subsequent magnification to the appellate jurisdiction in the statute appears not to have had any impact on these line of cases.
103. Board of Educ. v. Rockford Educ. Ass'n, 150 Il. App. 3d, 198, 501 N.E.2d 338,
(App. Ct. 2d Dist 1986), rev'd, 123 Il1.2d 216, 526 N.E.2d 149 (1988).
104. 157 Ill. App. 3d 439, 510 N.E.2d 508 (App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1987), aff'd, 123 II1.2d
216, 526 N.E.2d 149 (1988).
105. Rockford, 150 Ill. App. 3d 198, 501 N.E.2d 338.
106. Board of Trustees v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 139 Ill. App. 3d 617,
487 N.E.2d 956 (App. Ct. Ist Dist. 1986), rev'd, 123 Ill. 2d 216, 526 N.E.2d 149 (1988).
107. 123 11. 2d 216, 526 N.E.2d 149 (1988).
108. Id. at 217, 526 N.E.2d at 150 (discussing the unreported circuit court case).
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grievance alleging that the termination violated the collective bargaining agreement. 10 9 The Union specifically alleged that certain
procedures for the evaluation and termination of teachers were violated and, after processing the grievance through the entire grievance procedure, the labor organization attempted to submit the
grievance to binding arbitration as provided in the labor agreement. 110 In so doing the labor organization sought the reinstatement
of the teacher in question with full back wages and other benefits.",
The matter went to arbitration, and the arbitrator ultimately ruled
in favor of the employee and the union." 2 Subsequently, the District
filed a petition in circuit court to vacate the arbitrator's award at
which time the IELRB intervened to claim that jurisdiction to review the failure to comply with an arbitration award lay with the
IELRB under section 14(a)(8) of the Act."'
The Illinois Supreme Court began its consideration of this jurisdictional dispute with the stunning pronouncement that the Act
"revolutionizes Illinois school labor law.""11 4 The court further stated
that, because the General Assembly in promulgating the Act declared that educational labor disputes were "injurious to the public"
and determined that "adequate means must be established for minimizing them and providing for their resolution," the General Assembly set forth in the Act a comprehensive labor regulatory scheme
including a requirement that collective bargaining agreements between educational employers and labor organizations contain a binding grievance and arbitration clause.1' 5 With this strong emphasis on
the use of grievance arbitration as a means of minimizing labor disputes in educational employment, and the establishment of the
IELRB with the expertise to pass on questions arising under the
statute, the court decided that jurisdiction in the circuit courts was
divested in favor of the IELRB."16
In addition, the court relied on various other bases for its decision. For example, the court relied on the fact that all decisions of
109. Id
110. Id.
111. Id.
112.

Id.

113. Id. at 218, 526 N.E.2d at 151 (discussing the unreported circuit court case). The
circuit court upon consideration ruled in favor of appellant jurisdiction that jurisdiction properly lied with it. Id. Subsequently on appeal, the Fourth District Appellate Court reversed the
circuit court, holding that original jurisdiction over educational arbitration awards belonged
exclusively to the Board. 157 Ill. App. 3d 439, 510 N.E.2d 508.
114. 123 I11.
2d 216, 526 N.E.2d 149.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 219, 526 N.E.2d at 152.
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the Board were appealable in the Fourth District Court, revealing117a
legislative intent for uniformity in this substantive area of the law.
The court also compared the IELRA to its sister statute, the IPLRA, and relied on the fact that the IPLRA, unlike the IELRA,
still provided for the review of arbitration awards in the circuit
courts under the Uniform Arbitration Act.118
In conclusion, the court left open the question whether certain
types of arbitration decisions could be reviewed at all because it is
not possible to refuse to comply with those awards (e.g. a case where
the grievance is denied and the employer complies with the award by
continuing its conduct permitted by the arbitrator). The court simply
stated that it was an "interesting and troubling argument" not
presented by the facts of that case. 19
All of the cases cited above arose in the context of reviewing an
arbitrator's award after the grievance had been heard. There remained for some the question of jurisdiction and the role of the circuit courts in this process when there was an attempt to enjoin arbitration from taking place. In Board of Education v. Warren
Township High School,1 20 the Illinois Supreme Court was faced
with this question, and relying on its rationale in Compton, ruled
that the circuit courts were similarly divested of jurisdiction prior to
arbitration as well as after the issuance of the award. 21
With jurisdiction firmly placed with the IELRB, the Board then
determined what would be the standard of review once the award is
issued. 22 In Chicago Board of Education, the Board held that under
section 14(a)(8) it would look to see whether there was a binding
award rendered in accordance with the grievance procedure, whether
the proceedings were fair and impartial, whether the proceeding or
award was repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act,
whether there was any basic challenge to the award's legitimacy
(e.g. improper influences) and finally, whether the award conflicts
with any other statutes as prohibited in section 10(b). 123 To date, all
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. In a subsequent case raising this very question, the Board has ruled that adherence
to an arbitrator's award denying the grievance, and permitting continued conduct by the employer which allegedly violates some state statute, violates section 14(a)(5) of the Act prohibiting bargaining in bad faith by an employer. Southern Illinois University, 5 P.E.R.I. (LRP)
(IELRB Opinion and Order, October 5, 1989).
120. 128 II1. 2d 155, 538 N.E.2d 524 (1989).
121. Id. at 156-57, 538 N.E.2d at 525-26.
122. See Chicago Bd. of Educ., 2 P.E.R.I. (LRP) 1089 (1986).
123. Id. at VII-256.
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challenges to labor arbitration awards in public educational employment have turned on the last factor. 2 4 In fact, the argument has, in
most cases, been an attempt by employers to resurrect the nondelegability doctrine as a conflict with other statutes. 2 In ruling on
these cases, the IELRB has taken what can best be characterized as
a narrow approach. That is to say, the Board has ruled that the
award must conflict with a "specific statutory directive," and that
the mere fact that a subject matter that is a subject of a labor arbitration award is mentioned in another statute will not be sufficient to
26
set aside the award.
In Dundee Community Unit School District No. 300,127 the
Board was faced squarely with a claim that the nondelegability doctrine excused the failure of an educational employer to comply with
an arbitration award which required the reinstatement and payment
of back pay to a head custodian. 28 Specifically, the District relied on
that portion of the School Code which granted school boards the exclusive "power to 'employ . . . noncertified employees ... . ,
The Board began its analysis by pointing out that the Act imposed a
legal duty on employers to bargain in good faith and to comply with
arbitration awards, obligations which were not present in the past. 3 0
It then, in contrast, explored various earlier holdings of Illinois
courts which provided that, although an educational employer could
agree to a collective bargaining agreement, any such agreement or
the enforcement thereof, could not undermine the exclusive powers
of the school board."' The Board then pointed out that as recently
as 1981, at least one justice of the Illinois Supreme Court bemoaned
the fact that such circumstances, where a public agency is allowed to
repudiate its contract, can only lead to instability and frustration
124.

Compare Dundee Community Unit School Dist. No. 300, 5 P.E.R.I. (LRP)

1 1070, at IX-158 (1989) (wherein the Board held that the arbitration award would be binding under the Act because it was not in conflict with the Illinois School Code under section
10(b) of the Act) with Township High School District No. 205, 4 P.E.R.I. (LRP) 1 1040, at

153 (1988) (wherein the Board held that an arbitration award was not binding because implementation of an article in the collective bargaining agreement would be in violation of the
Illinois School Code within the meaning of section 10(b)).
125. See, e.g., Dundee, 5 P.E.R.I. (LRP) 1 1070; Township High School, 4 P.E.R.I.
(LRP) 1 1040.
126. See, e.g. , Dundee, 5 P.E.R.I. (LRP) 1 1070, at IX-158; Township High School, 4
P.E.R.I. (LRP) 1 1040, at X-153 (citing Board of Governors, 3 P.E.R.I. (LRP) 1 1075

(1987)).
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

5 P.E.R.I. (LRP) 1 1070 (1989).
Id. at IX-155.
Id. at IX-158.
Id. at IX-156.
Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol7/iss1/4

16

1989]

Perkovich and Stein: Challenges to Arbitration Under Illinois Public Sector Labor Rela
Challenges to Arbitration

such that "[t] he ultimate loser is the public ... .

In the Board's

33
view, those very circumstances led to the passage of the IELRA.

The Board then looked to the same provisions relied upon by the
Compton court and concluded that those provisions, particularly

those requiring binding arbitration and imposing a duty to bargain
in good faith on educational employers and labor organizations,
clearly eliminated the legal basis upon which the nondelegability
doctrine was grounded. 34 Therefore, a board of education's powers
could be subordinated to the terms of a collective bargaining agree-

ment only to the extent that section 10(b) of the Act permits.13 5
Accordingly, the Board then said that the proper basis for re-

viewing any conflict between the powers and authorities ,of educational employers and collective bargaining agreements or arbitration
awards was to determine whether the collective bargaining agree-

ment by its express terms, or through the operation of an arbitration
award, created a conflict to the extent that the agreement or award

should be ignored. 136 To resolve the alleged conflict, the Board then
examined the School Code to determine if any provision therein prohibited the agreement of a school board with a labor organization to
limit discipline and discharge to just cause; in those cases where just
cause was not demonstrated there should be reinstatement and back

pay. " The Board concluded that statutory provisions providing for
132. Dundee, 5 P.E.R.I (LRP)
1070, at IX-156 (quoting Board of Educ. v. Chicago
Teachers' Union, 88 Ill. 2d 63, 430 N.E.2d 1111 (1981)).
133. Dundee, 5 P.E.R.I. (LRP)
1070, at IX-156.
134. Id.
135. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1710 (b) (1985) states in pertinent part that:
The parties to the collective bargaining process shall not effect or implement a provision in a collective bargaining agreement if the implementation of that provision
would be in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with any statute or statutes enacted by the General Assembly of Illinois. The parties to the collective bargaining process may effect or implement a provision in a collective bargaining
agreement if the implementation of that provision has the effect of supplementing
any provision in any statute or statutes enacted by the General Assembly of Illinois
pertaining to wages, hours, or other conditions of employment; provided however, no
provision in a collective bargaining agreement may be effected or implemented if
such provision has the effect of negating, abrogating, replacing, reducing, diminishing, or limiting in any way any employee rights, guarantees or privileges pertaining
to wages, hours or other conditions of employment provided in such statutes. Any
provision in a collective bargaining agreement which has the effect of negating, abrogating, replacing, reducing, diminishing or limiting in any way any employee
rights, guarantees or privileges provided in an Illinois statute or statutes shall be
void and unenforceable, but shall not affect the validity, enforceability and implementation of other permissible provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
136. Dundee, 5 P.E.R.I. (LRP) 1070, at IX-158.
137. Id.
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authority in school boards to employ personnel and defining their
employment duties do not prohibit just cause in a grievance and arbitration provision.138 The Board so ruled because the agreement to
limit discharge and discipline to just cause and to place under review, via the grievance arbitration, did not violate a "specific statutory directive,""3 9 but rather touched on a subject also dealt with in
the School Code. In the eyes of the Board, such overlap or congruity
of subject matters does not constitute a conflict prohibited by section
10(b).
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Illinois General Assembly devised a comprehensive regulatory scheme over collective bargaining in public education with the IELRA. This scheme, as interpreted by the IELRB and the Illinois courts, places jurisdiction over
the review and enforcement of arbitration proceedings and awards in
the IELRB subject to judicial review. However, because public employees who are not employed by public schools are under the jurisdiction of another statute, the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, a
review of challenges to arbitration under that statute is in order.
2. Challenges Under the IPLRA-A Different Statute Achieving Similar Purposes.-Draftedduring the same legislative session
in 1984, the IELRA and the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act
(hereinafter "IPLRA") together were intended to provide "a comprehensive regulatory scheme for public sector bargaining in Illinois." 40 However, these "sister" statutes took dramatically different
approaches to the role that the newly created Labor Relations
Boards would take in the grievance arbitration process. Due to this
difference in approach, disputes concerning grievance arbitration in
the Illinois public schools are now adjudicated under a very different
process than similar disputes arising in the remaining segment of the
Illinois public sector.
The IELRA, effective January 1, 1984, covered all public school
In enacting the
districts, colleges and universities in the state.'
IELRA, the General Assembly recognized "that substantial differences exist between educational employees and other public employees. ...."142
In contrast to the IELRA's approach, the IPLRA, effective July
1, 1984, did not divest the Illinois courts of their traditional jurisdic138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
1040, at IX-153.
Township High School, 4 P.E.R.I. (LRP)
See Board of Educ. v. Compton, 123 II1.2d 216, 219, 526 N.E.2d 149, 152 (1988).
ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1701 (1985).
Id.
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tion over issues concerning grievance arbitration.' 43 The specific provisions of the IPLRA pertaining to the grievance procedure and ar44
bitration are quite different than those found in the IELRA.1
Under the IPLRA, parties to a collective bargaining agreement may
mutually agree that their agreement will contain a grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration.145 However, unlike the
IELRA, they may also agree otherwise. 46 Any agreement that does
contain an arbitration provision must also contain a provision prohibiting strikes during the duration of the agreement. 47 Unlike the
IELRA, there is no provision of the IPLRA providing that it is an
unfair labor practice to refuse to comply with a binding arbitration
award.' 4
The interplay between other state statutes and the collective
bargaining process is dealt with similarly under the IELRA and the
IPLRA. 49 The IPLRA provides, as does section 10(b) of the
IELRA, that parties may bargain over matters concerning wages,
hours and other terms and conditions of employment that are not
specifically in violation of other state law. 150 The IPLRA also allows
parties to enter into agreements that supplement, implement, or relate to the effect of such provisions in other laws.' 5 ' Once a collective
bargaining agreement has been reached, its provisions will supersede
any contrary statutes, charters, ordinances, rules and regulations re52
lated to wages, hours and conditions of employment.
Finally, the IPLRA vests jurisdiction to compel or stay arbitration, or to vacate, modify or correct an arbitration award in the circuit courts, rather than in the two labor relations boards created
under the statute. 153 The statute provides that the grievance and ar143.

ILL. REV.

STAT.

144.

ILL. REV.

STAT.

ch. 48, para. 1601 (1985).
ch. 48, para. 1608 (1985) which provides that the "grievance and

arbitration provisions of any collective bargaining agreement shall be subject to the Illinois

Uniform Arbitration Act."
145. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1608 (1985).
146.
147.

Id.
Id.
148. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48 para. 1610(a) (1985).
149. Compare ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1607 (1985) with ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
para. 1710(b) (1985).
150. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1710 (1985).
151. Id.
152. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1615(b) (1986).

153. See ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 48, para. 1605(a) (1986) (stating that the Illinois State

Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction over the state of Illinois and units of local government
with a population not exceeding one million persons); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1605(b)
(1986) (stating that the Illinois Local Labor Relations Board has jurisdiction over units of
local government, Chicago and Cook County, with populations in excess of one million
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bitration provisions of any collective bargaining agreement shall be
subject to the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act (hereinafter
"UAA").
Under the UAA, proceedings to compel or stay arbitration are
properly held in the circuit court. 155 However, the Arbitration Act
specifically states that it does not apply to "vacating, modifying, or
correcting" any award entered as a result of an arbitration proceeding which is part or pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.'5
The statute provides that the "grounds for vacating, modifying or
correcting such an award shall be those which existed prior to the
enactment of this act."'1 57 The courts have, therefore, held both
before and after the IPLRA's effective date that a court must look to
the common law which existed prior to the enactment of the UAA
when considering vacating an arbitration award that was rendered
pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement.158 Presumably, then,
any of the common law defenses to arbitration or compliance with
an award that could have been asserted prior to enactment of the
IPLRA have survived the Act's effective date. 59 Furthermore, after
having taken the unique, perhaps even "revolutionary" step of vesting jurisdiction over arbitration issues in the educational sector in
the Educational Labor Relations Board, the legislature took a far
more traditional approach in the IPLRA, leaving jurisdiction over
the rest of the public sector in the courts. It will, therefore, be for
the courts, rather than the IPLRA's two labor relations boards, to
interpret the statute and fashion the law concerning arbitration disputes in the remainder of Illinois' public sector.
3. Arbitration Issues Under the IPLRA.a. Was There an Agreement to Arbitrate?- Even prior
to the enactment of the IPLRA, the Illinois courts had looked to the
U.S. Supreme Courts' Steelworkers Trilogy,'60 discussed earlier in
persons).
154.
155.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 101 (1975).
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 10, para. 102 (1975).
156. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, para. 112(e) (1975).
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Chicago Teachers Union, 86 II1. 2d 469, 427 N.E.2d
1199 (1981); City of DeKalb v International Ass'n of Firefighters, 182 I11.
App. 2d 367, 538
N.E.2d 867 (App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989).
159. The nondelegability doctrine, which was only sporadically applied to public employers other than school districts, has probably not survived due to the operation of section 7
of the IPLRA.
160. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United

Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); see also supra note

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol7/iss1/4

20

Perkovich and Stein: Challenges
toArbitration
Arbitration Under Illinois Public Sector Labor Rela
Challenges to

this Article, for guidance. The state supreme court noted in Board of
Trustees v: Cook County College Teachers Union,'61 that the Illinois
legislature had adopted the UAA only one year after the Steelworkers Trilogy cases were decided and that the legislature had thereby
"endorsed the policy of treating arbitration in collective bargaining
cases as a unique agency." 16 2 Citing the Steelworkers Trilogy, the
court explained that the nature and extent of an arbitrator's power
will depend upon what the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration, and that an arbitrator will have exceeded the scope of his authority when he decides matters that were not submitted for his
16 3
resolution.
The Court went on to endorse the other basic principles of the
Steelworkers Trilogy that: (1) it is the arbitrator's construction of
the contract that has been bargained for; (2) the courts should not
impose their own interpretation of the contract when it is different
than the arbitrator's interpretation; and (3) a court's inquiry into the
merits of an arbitrator's award should be limited only to a determination of whether the award drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. 6

With the Illinois Supreme Court's early endorsement of the
Steelworkers Trilogy principles, it would be expected that the lower
courts then could have been expected not only to show great deference to awards once rendered, but also to broadly construe the arbitration clauses found in public sector collective bargaining agreements. Nonetheless, public sector employers have enjoyed some
success in convincing Illinois appellate courts that their disputes with
labor unions are not subject to their contractual grievance and arbitration clauses in the first instance as described below.
In a leading case, Croom v. City of DeKalb,165 the Illinois Appellate Court specifically rejected the employer's contention that "for
an issue to be arbitrable it must be 'stated in the contract between
the parties in crystal clear language unextended and unenlarged either by construction or by implication.' ""6 Such a standard was ap-

propriate in the context of commercial litigation but not in the realm
of collective bargaining. The court cited both Board of Trustees and
22 and accompanying text.
161. 74 III. 2d 412, 386 N.E.2d 47 (1979).
162. Id. at 419, 386 N.E.2d at 50.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 420, 386 N.E.2d at 51 (citing Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. at

599).
165.

71 111. App. 3d 370, 389 N.E.2d 647 (App. Ct. 1979).

166. Id. at 375, 389 N.E.2d at 651.
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the Steelworkers Trilogy cases and concluded, citing the United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co. decision that the arbitrator may consider "the industrial common law,"
that arbitration was "a means of solving the unforeseeable," a
method for giving meaning and content to the agreement.167 The
Court cited the Supreme Court's decision in Warrior & Gulf, giving
an admonition that "[a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance
should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance
that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that
covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of
coverage." 68 Nonetheless, the court then proceeded to find the grievance before it inarbitrable. 6" The court found that although the parties' agreement broadly defined what constituted a grievance, it had
limited application to grievances that involved "the interpretation or
application of the express provisions of the agreement." " ' The court
concluded that not all grievances arising under the contract in dis7
pute were arbitrable.1 1
The Croom court then found that there was no express contractual provision pertaining to the union's grievance which concerned
the issue of additional pay for firefighters assigned duties of acting
officers. 7 The court then rejected the union's argument that the
contract's general provisions concerning wages was sufficient to
render the instant dispute arbitrable. 7 3 Apparently forgotten were
any notions concerning the "industrial common law" and "solving
the unforeseeable.' ' 4 It seems safe to say that any doubts concerning the meaning of the arbitration clause in Croom were not resolved
17 5
in favor of coverage.
A similar result was reached in Lodge No. 822 International
Association of Machinists v. City of Quincy.176 Citing both the
Board of Trustees case and the Steelworkers Trilogy, the Appellate
Court found a dispute concerning the union's allegation that the employer was hiring temporary workers to fill full-time positions inarbi167. Id. at 375, 389 N.E.2d at 650 (quoting Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
581-82).
168. Id. at 373, 389 N.E.2d at 650 (quoting Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
at 582-83).
169. Id. at 376, 389 N.E.2d at 652.
170. Id. at 375, 389 N.E.2d at 651.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 376, 389 N.E.2d at 652.
173. Id. at 375, 389 N.E.2d at 651.
174. Id.
175. See id.
176. 137 III. App. 3d 425, 484 N.E.2d 464 (App. Ct. 1985).
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trable."' The employer contended that the temporary workers were

not subject to the collective bargaining agreement. 17 8 The court
found the dispute inarbitrable because it could not locate any nexus
between the dispute and the terms of the parties' agreement despite

the agreement's coverage of full-time employees. 7 9
A dissenting justice suggested that while an arbitrator might

reach the same conclusions in regard to the merits of the grievance,
a sufficient nexus rendering the dispute arbitrable had been estab-

lished due to the contract's stated coverage of full-time employees. 180
The justice wrote that the majority had decided issues that might
have been addressed by an arbitrator in reaching his conclusion.',' It
would seem that the courts have, in the guise of deciding upon arbitrability, been all too willing to decide the merits of the issues that

unions have sought to submit to an arbitrator.8 2
Since the enactment of the IPLRA, the Illinois Supreme Court

has held that in the statute itself the legislature has again expressed
a strong preference for arbitration.' 3 It remains to be seen to what
177. Id. at 431, 484 N.E.2d at 468.
178. Id. at 427, 484 N.E.2d at 466.
179. Id. at 431, 484 N.E.2d at 468.
180. See id. at 431-32, 484 N.E.2d at 468-69 (Green, J., dissenting).
181. Id. at 431, 484 N.E.2d at 468.
182. See Toole, Judicial Activism in Public Sector Grievance Arbitration: A Study of
Recent Development, 33 ARB. J. 6 (1978) (suggesting that many state courts have been willing
to interfere with the public sector arbitration process at all stages).
183. See City of Decatur v. AFSCME Local 268, 122 Ill. 2d 353, 522 N.E.2d 1219
(1988). In Decatur, the court relied upon section 8 of the IPLRA. Id. (relying on ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 48, para. 1608 (1988)). Nonetheless, in Village of Creve Coeur v. Fletcher, the
Appellate Court held that a police officer's suspension was not subject to the collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure where the suspension had already been considered by
the Village's Board of Commissioners pursuant to the Fire and Police Commission Act. 187
Ill. App. 3d 116, 543 N.E.2d 323 (App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1989) (resting on ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24,
para. 10-2.1 et. seq. (1985)). While expressly acknowledging that a contractual interpretation
that would allow disciplinary actions to be processed through the contractual grievance procedure was plausible, the court concluded that such a result woud be "irrational." Id. at 117,
543 N.E.2d at 324. The court hypothesized that if a disciplinary action was subject both to the
Fire and Police Commission Act and the collective bargaining agreement's grievance procedure, that potentially a police officers immediate surpervising sergeant could reach a decision,
under the grievance procedure, that was contrary to the decision of the Board of Commissioners. Id. The court did not consider the applicability of the IPLRA in reaching its decision. See
id. Nor did the court distinguish its decision from the Fourth Appellate District's decision in
Board of Governors v. IELRB, 170 I11.App. 3d 463, 524 N.E.2d 758 (App. Ct. 4th Dist.
1988), in which the court held that the procedures established under an Act to create the State
Universities Civil Service system "were not the exclusive method of reviewing an employee
discharge where a concurrent applicable grievance procedure existed." Id. at 470, 524 N.E.2d
at 766 (referring to ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 24 , para. 38(b)(3)(11) (1985)). in this case the
court held that the availability of the Civil Service hearing process and appellate review
through the courts, did not preclude arbitration of a discharge pursuant to the collective bar-
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extent the lower courts will take this preference to heart.
b. Nondelegation Under the IPLRA.-The "nondelegability doctrine" has rarely been applied to cases that did not involve
school districts. However, the Illinois Appellate Court did hold prior
to the IPLRA that the doctrine did apply to the remainder of the
public sector. 1 4 As discussed earlier, the "nondelegability doctrine"
in theory prohibited public employers from delegating their powers
to decide basic matters concerning their operations to any third
party, including an arbitrator.185 The doctrine was generally invoked
upon an employer's assertion that a particular power was vested in it
alone pursuant to state statute. 186 Therefore, the crux of the employer's argument hinged upon a contention that a subject was covered by a state statute and that arbitration concerning this subject
18 7
matter was therefore precluded even if it had been bargained.
With the enactment of the IPLRA, it is likely that any such
contentions will now be made in the context of whether a given topic
is a mandatory subject of bargaining in the first instance. Employers
are likely to contend, as they have in other jurisdictions, that a matter is outside the mandatory scope of bargaining and should therefore become inarbitable even if covered under the terms of the parties' agreement. 88 However, any such contentions will most likely be
resolved under section 7 of the IPLRA, 189 which approximates sec90°
tion 10 of the IELRA.
The Illinois Supreme Court has already shown that it is unlikely
to be sympathetic to such an argument. In City of Decatur v.
gaining agreement. See id. at 474, 524 N.E.2d at 770.
184. See County of Will v. Local 1028 Will County Employees Union, 790 II. App. 3d
290, 398 N.E.2d 139 (App. Ct. 1979) (finding that the fixing of the county employees' salaries
was the sole nondelegable duty of the County Board, which derives its authority and duty from
the legislative mandate which establishes that the county adopt a budget).

185. See supra text accompanying notes 55-74 (discussing non-delegability doctrine issues and challenges).

186. See id.
187.

Id.

188. See, e.g., Minneapolis Fed'n of Teachers v. Minneapolis School Dist. No. 1, 258
N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 1977) (holding that although the school's transfer policy was not a

mandatory subject of collective bargaining, the transfers were still subject to binding arbitration in order to determine if they conformed to the criteria established by the School District);

Susquehanna Valley Central School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers Ass'n, 37 N.Y.2d
614, 376 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1975) (rejecting the School District's argument that it should not be
forced to arbitrate a grievance regarding the size of its staff where the collective bargaining
agreement provided for additional staffing and stating that the District was free under N.Y,'s

Taylor Law to bargain voluntarily, as well as voluntarily submit disputes to arbitration).
189. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1710 (1986).
190. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48, para. 1607 (1986).
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AFSCME,191 the Court held:
As the language of Section 7 indicates, the mere existence of a
statute on a subject does not, without more, remove that subject
from the scope of the bargaining duty. For example, one type of
statute that would not relieve an employer of the duty to bargain
over an otherwise mandatory subject of bargaining would be a provision establishing a minimum level of benefit, such as a minimum
wage law or minimum salary law. In that case, wages would remain a mandatory subject of bargaining, and the employees' bargaining representative would be free to insist on a level
higher-but not lower-than that required by law.192
Thus, it would seem, especially in light of the Court's recognition of the IPLRA's preference for arbitration, that the court would
hold that once a subject has been bargained, and an agreement to
arbitrate a dispute is reached, the agreement to arbitrate will be enforceable and any award rendered will be binding. It was the IPLRA
itself that gave public employers the authority to enter into such
agreements and the obligation to abide by an arbitrator's decision.
c. Vacating an Arbitration Award Because it Violates
Public Policy.-In Illinois, there is no precise definition of public
policy. However, in AFSCME v. State,'9 3 the Illinois Supreme Court
enunciated the standards that it would follow concerning public policy questions raised under the IPLRA, and most probably the
IELRA as well.' 94

In determining public policy, Illinois courts may look to the
Constitution, statutes, or, when these are silent, to judicial decisions.195 While noting that it was not bound by federal decisions because Illinois has a different arbitration statute, the Illinois Supreme
Court cited both W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759,196 and
United PaperworkersInternational Union v. Misco, Inc.1 97 with approval for the proposition that a violation of public policy must be
clearly shown and public policy exceptions should be extremely nar191. 122 11. 2d 353, 522 N.E.2d 1219 (1988).
192. Id. at 364, 522 N.E.2d at 1224 (citations omitted).
193. 124 111.2d 246, 529 N.E.2d 534 (1988).
194. See id. at 262, 529 N.E.2d at 541 (holding that a state's concern over the quality
of care received by its mental patients must be weighed against the policy of fostering relationships between employers and employees, and the finality of arbitration awards).
195. Id. at 262, 529 N.E.2d at 540.
196. 461 U.S. 757 (1983).
197. 484 U.S. 29 (1987).
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row in scope.' 98
In the instant case, the grievants had been authorized to leave a
mental health institution to shop for a barbecue. 199 Instead of returning promptly, they spent another hour and fifteen minutes on
unauthorized personal business. 200 During their absence, a resident
in the wing, who was not the grievants' responsibility, died while left
unattended.20 The grievants were then discharged. 0 2
The arbitrator found that although the grievants had left the
worksite while it was short staffed, there was otherwise "no direct
link between their unauthorized absence and the resident's death. 203
In addition, the employees had exemplary records prior to this incident.2 4 Taking these and other mitigating factors into account, the
arbitrator concluded that the grievants' behavior did not constitute
"just cause" for their discharge and ordered them reinstated, reducing the disciplinary action to four-month suspensions. 05
In considering the employer's argument that the arbitrator's
award violated public policy, the court stated that it recognized that
Illinois had a commitment to compassionate care for the mentally
disabled. 20 6 However, the court also found that "[t]his case . . . involved the public policy of promoting constructive relationships between public employees and the public policy which requires finality
in arbitration awards. 20 7 The arbitration award in this case did not
violate any explicit public policy, and the court refused to vacate
it. 2 o8

It would thus seem unlikely that a public policy defense would
prevail except under the most extreme circumstances. It should be
noted that an award that sanctions violations of law will be vacated. 20 9 However, even this exception will most likely be limited to
198. See AFSCME, 124 Ill. 2d 246, 529 N.E.2d 534 (1988) (citing W.R. Grace, 461
U.S. at 766 and Misco, 484 U.S. at 108).

199. AFSCME, id. at 250, 529 N.E.2d at 536.
200. Id. at 251, 529 N.E.2d at 536.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 262, 529 N.E.2d at 541.

207.

Id.

208.
209.

Id. at 265, 529 N.E.2d at 542.
See Board of Trustees 508 v. Cook County College Teachers Union, 74 I11.2d 412,

386 N.E.2d 47 (1979) (vacating an arbitration award which gave priority in assignment of
extra work to a union member who had participated in a pre-IELRA illegal strike as repugnant to public policy); see also City of DeKalb v. Local 1236, 182 I11.App. 3d 367, 538

N.E.2d 867 (App. Ct. 2d Dist. 1989). In DeKalb, a clause in the collective bargaining agree-
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instances in which the award is repugnant to, or inconsistent with,
the specific provisions of a statute.
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

Even prior to the enactment of the IELRA and IPLRA, the
Illinois courts consistently found that there was a presumption in
favor of arbitrability which extended to public sector contract disputes. However, prior to the collective bargaining statutes, this presumption, particularly in the educational area, was too often eroded
by employers' invocation of the "nondelegability doctrine" to avoid
their agreement to arbitrate.
Although we are reluctant to say that the nondelegability doctrine is dead, we believe it is safe to say it has been wounded, and
that its wounds are tended to by section 10(b) of the IELRA, the
IELRB and section 7 of the IPLRA. Those provisions reasonably
accomodate public employer needs, legislation, and doctrinal law.
This doctrinal law grants employees their rights to enforce collective
bargaining agreements which are negotiated by their own exclusive
representatives.
As to Illinois' unique statutory framework, which vests jurisdiction over arbitration in public education in the IELRB while retaining traditional court jurisdiction under the IPLRA, one must resist
the temptation to draw any overbroad conclusions. Yet, it seems safe
to conclude that by vesting jurisdiction in one labor board rather
than in the multiple districts of the courts, unions and employers
have been ensured of a uniformity of decisionmaking that could not
have otherwise been expected. In the future, we shall see to what
extent the IELRB and the courts travel a common path.

ment which provided for payment to disabled firefighters of the difference between a
firefighter's regular pay and state disability pension benefits was void as against public policy.
Id. The contractual provision was held to be in conflict with Illinois the statute that provided
for uniform pension benefits for disabled firemen. See id. However, the court also held that the

IPLRA was inapplicable because firefighters had not been included in the statute's coverage at
the time material to the dispute. Id.
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